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Abstract
Critics of school choice argue that when private schools compete with public schools,
they select the best public school students (cream-skim), increasing socioeconomic seg-
regation. I study the mechanisms that underlie student sorting in a mixed public-private
system using a 2008 education reform implemented in Chile aimed at decreasing educa-
tion inequality. Specifically, I exploit the shock to schools’ incentives to test for whether
schools select students based on socioeconomic characteristics. I show that low-SES
parents’ school choices are restricted by private school cream-skimming behavior. I
estimate a demand model incorporating these admissions restrictions to capture par-
ents’ preferences for different school characteristics and peer composition. I show that
ignoring cream-skimming leads to underestimating poor parents’ preferences for school
quality. My model shows that heterogeneous parental preferences for high-SES peers
seem to be the main driver behind socioeconomic segregation. I find that the decrease
in cream-skimming induced by Chile’s reform led to lower public school enrollment, and
that strong preferences for high-SES peers drove increased enrollment in schools that
opted out of the reform. Overall, this led to increased segregation, especially in more
competitive markets.
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1 Introduction
Educational reforms in numerous countries introduce competition between schools by in-
creasing parental choice via school vouchers.1 In theory, increased competition between
educational institutions should result in the provision of better school quality to attract
students.2 However, there is concern that school choice programs may increase social strat-
ification in education systems and weaken public schools if higher-income students migrate
to private voucher schools (Manski, 1992; Epple and Romano, 1998; Nechyba, 1999). In-
deed, previous studies have shown that private voucher schools ended up serving a wealthier
population at the expense of public schools, leading to increased socioeconomic segregation
across schools (Gauri, 1999; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Chakrabarti, 2013; Contreras et al.,
2010). Entry of private schools has been associated with stratification, consistent with pri-
vate schools cream-skimming high income students from the public sector (McEwan et al.,
2008). Such increased segregation may be an important contributor to long-run inequality.
Studies on school desegregation plans in the late 1960s and 1970s have linked increased school
segregation with increased criminal activity, lower educational attainment for minorities, and
lower graduation rates (Guryan, 2004; Weiner et al., 2009; Billings et al., 2014).
This paper examines the demand and supply-side mechanisms behind observed increases
in socioeconomic segregation resulting from school choice programs. Separate empirical iden-
tification of these mechanisms is challenging because demand and supply are simultaneously
determined and only equilibrium outcomes are observed. On the supply side, private schools
may have incentives to select higher-income students to improve overall test results.3 On
the demand side, the potential effects of school choice programs on segregation depend on
1Chile, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Colombia, and the U.S have all
implemented school choice programs of different scales.
2The case for educational vouchers and increased educational choice was initially made initially by Friedman
(1962). Yet, empirical evidence does not show systematic effects in achievement or efficiency in either direction.
Results depend on the context and design of the choice program and are heterogeneous across different groups.
Hoxby and Murarka (2009) study charter schools in New York City, and Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) study charter
schools in Chicago finding modest gains. Rouse (1998) studies a voucher program in Milwaukee and finds no effects
on reading, but significant effects on math. Angrist et al. (2002) examine vouchers in Colombia, finding large positive
effects. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) analyze voucher experiments in India and find no effect on test
scores, except for Hindi, but they also show that private schools spend much less than public schools. Several papers
have studied the Chilean voucher program implemented in 1981, finding no evidence that choice improved average
educational outcomes (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006).
3Numerous studies show that family income and parental education are the main factors explaining student
achievement and standardized test results. Thus private schools may attract parents and students on the basis of
superior average levels of test scores, but higher average test scores may be explained by sorting of self-selected high
achievers, so schools may not be actually adding more value (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Cullen et al., 2006)
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parents’ preferences for different school characteristics and peer composition. Heterogeneous
preferences across different socioeconomic groups may explain how parents sort across dif-
ferent schools. For instance, high-income parents may focus more on school quality, while
low-income parents may focus more on convenience factors, such as distance. Furthermore,
high correlation between socioeconomic status and test scores, make it difficult to disentangle
whether parents care more about test scores or peer quality.
To measure the relative importance of these mechanisms on segregation, I exploit a 2008
reform to the Chilean voucher system.4 This reform changed the previous flat voucher (same
per-student amount across schools) to a two-tier voucher based on students’ socioeconomic
status (SES), with a larger voucher for low-SES students. This allows me to test for cream-
skimming behavior among private schools and examine how low-SES students respond to
the resulting decrease in admission restrictions to private schools. Cream-skimming in this
context refers to private schools’ preferential selection of students based on their socioeco-
nomic characteristics. Moreover, the reform allowed schools to choose whether they wanted
to participate in the new program (SEP schools) or opt out (non-SEP schools), separating
private subsidized schools in two groups. This induced resorting of students that led to
increased overall segregation.
I estimate a model of school choice that incorporates admission restrictions at private
schools based on student socioeconomic characteristics and allows for heterogeneous parental
preferences for school characteristics and peer composition. This contrasts with previous
work that assumes that parents can choose any school they are willing to travel to and pay
for which attributes any sorting pattern observed in the data to demand-side preferences,
rather than school selection. 5 This is inconsistent with the evidence on school behavior and
observed stratification in the Chilean system. I show that ignoring admission restrictions
significantly underestimates low-SES parents’ preferences for school quality.
I provide strong evidence that private schools engage in substantial cream-skimming. I
model schools’ admissions process in terms of a threshold in admitted student’s maternal
4Chile is one of the few countries that has a nation-wide voucher program which has been in place since 1981.
This makes it particularly suitable to studying student sorting and segregation in educational markets.
5Hastings et al. (2005), Neilson (2013), and Gallego and Hernando (2010) also estimate parental preferences for
school characteristics based on choices of schools, looking at heterogeneity in preferences across socio-economic groups.
Several other papers estimate parent preferences for schools based on residential location (Black, 1999; Bayer et al.,
2007).
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education, a proxy for SES. While school admission thresholds are endogenous to student
sorting, the timing of the 2008 reform allows me to test for cream-skimming behavior. I
show that admission thresholds decreased significantly following the reform, even for schools
that did not charge any tuition. Consequently, low-SES parents who faced strict admission
restrictions from private schools had more schools available to choose from after the reform.
This resulted in a 10 percentage points increase in the probability of low-SES students
enrolling in private subsidized schools. In the estimation of parental preferences, I use
observed admission thresholds for private subsidized schools to account for school selection.
The reform constitutes an exogenous shock to schools’ incentives to select more vulner-
able students, uncorrelated with parent’s preferences. Changes in SEP schools’ admission
thresholds, in response to the new voucher, create variation in school peer composition. I
use this variation to estimate parents’ preferences for school characteristics and peer qual-
ity, 6 and to study the effects of post-reform enrollment changes on segregation. I show
that low-SES parents care about quality characteristics like test scores, class size, and peer
quality. At the same time, high-SES parents have strong preferences for high-SES peers. A
one standard deviation increase in peer quality gives 10 times as much utility to high-SES
parents, as a one standard deviation increase in school average test scores.
These results point to two different effects of the Chilean reform on student sorting. First,
the reform directly impacted cream-skimming behavior at private subsidized SEP schools.
This decreased admission thresholds which together with low-SES parents’ preferences for
better schools account for higher enrollment of low-SES students in private subsidized SEP
schools following the reform. Second, there was an indirect effect induced by changes in
peer composition in SEP schools that accounts for the increased enrollment of high-SES
students in private subsidized schools that opted out of the reform (Non-SEP schools). This
is explained by strong preferences for better peers among high-SES parents.
These two changes in student sorting followed very distinct patterns. The first effect,
caused by the change in incentives for private SEP schools, results in a discrete jump in
the probability of low-SES students going to a SEP school immediately after the reform.
The second effect is caused by a response of high-SES parents to changes in peer charac-
teristics in SEP-schools, resulting from the first effect. This generated a gradual increase in
6In this setting, by peer quality I mean peer socioeconomic status given by the mother’s education. At first grade
admissions there is no information about student ability or test scores.
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the probability of high-SES students choosing a non-SEP school in the years following the
reform. Overall, this resulted in increased socioeconomic segregation, particularly in more
competitive educational markets.
My model shows that heterogeneous preferences for high-SES peers seem to be the main
driver behind segregation. I show that eliminating cream-skimming by schools may further
increase migration of students from public to private schools, with only a moderate decrease
on segregation. Policy makers may have major challenges in reducing segregation if pref-
erences for peer quality are so large for high-SES parents. This could be especially critical
given evidence that school segregation perpetuates long-term income inequality (Benabou,
1996).
My results fill a gap in the literature because little is known about the consequences of
such reforms on school stratification, and about how private schools respond to such policies.
Nechyba (2009) argues that cream-skimming can be alleviated through the careful design of
school choice programs, and that efficient programs should incentivize competition through
innovation and increased resource efficiency, rather than through selecting the best students
from public schools. Several studies have suggested deviating from the flat voucher. For
example, Neal (2002) and Gonza´lez et al. (2004) argue that vouchers that fall in value as
household income rises may partially offset incentives to cream-skim for competitive advan-
tage. The Chilean reform we examined here did effectively decreased cream-skimming, but
had little effect on overall segregation. Though the reform sought to decrease inequality
by giving more resources to schools serving low-SES students, it ignored the possibility of
student resorting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the description of
the model for school choice and the mechanisms behind socioeconomic segregation. Section
3 provides institutional background on Chile’s educational system and the 2008 reform.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides a descriptive analysis of changes in school
enrollment, segregation patterns, and schools’ participation decisions. Section 6 describes the
demand estimation in the presence of cream-skimming. Section 7 shows the counterfactuals
and Section 8 offers a summary and conclusions.
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2 Model for School Choice
This model integrates decisions of parents and schools at the moment of choosing an el-
ementary school for their children to explain the mechanisms behind student sorting. In
many settings where choice is increased, it is observed to increase the level of socioeconomic
segregation across schools, even in settings where there is no tuition. Different demand- and
supply-side mechanisms could drive these sorting patterns observed in school choice settings.
On the supply side, private schools could be selecting students in the admission process. If
schools are selecting students based on socioeconomic characteristics this would explain at
least part of the sorting. On the demand side, heterogeneous preferences for school char-
acteristics by parents from different socioeconomic background could explain the observed
sorting.
The process of applying and registering to elementary schools is not centralized and
parents have to apply to each school they are potentially considering, separately through
each school admission process.
A market consists of a set of students (I) and a set of schools (J). Students apply to
certain schools, and schools decide whether to admit or reject each applicant. Two types of
schools interact in each market, public and private subsidized schools. Public schools admit
all students that apply, but private schools have the ability to select students. Most schools
are tuition free and financed through government vouchers that are payed directly to each
school (both to public and private subsidized) based on student attendance. Private schools
are allowed to charge a top-up tuition, most choose not to charge anything and some charge
a small amount. I model parents’ decisions as a discrete choice of a single school from their
market.
Students are characterized by their type θ. The student type is given by their socioeco-
nomic status that will be defined as the education level of the mother.
Demand Model
The utility student i of type m gets from attending school j is given by:
Uimjt = αpijt +Xjtβm − γdijt + ξjt + εijt
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where
βm = β¯ + βoθm
Xjt are school characteristics and the preference parameters on each characteristic βz are
allowed to depend on the student type. pijt is the top-up tuition that school j charges student
i and this amount varies across students within each school. dijt is the distance for student
i to school j, ξjt is a year-school specific term that represents unobserved school quality.
εijt represents an unobserved idiosyncratic preference of student i for school j, distributed
independently across schools and students.
Parents choose the school that maximizes their utility within the schools that admit
them.
Student Achievement
Achievement of student i depend on the student’s type θi and school characteristics Xj, like
class size, teacher quality, type of school, peer quality etc.




Test scores are increasing in type which is supported by the literature7. This translates
into marginal cost of educating a student decreasing in type.
Private School Objective Function
Under a voucher program, public and private subsidized schools compete in each market.
All schools (both public and private subsidized) receive a voucher v from the government per
student enrolled. Private schools’ objective function is likely to differ across different schools.
Some schools may be profit-maximizers and some schools are non-profit institutions, but still
may care about school rankings that are based on results from nationwide standardized test
scores. Private subsidized schools are modeled as Bertrand-Nash competitors that maximize
profits by choosing admission thresholds on the students’ type. Each private subsidized
7
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school has an unobserved capacity qj. I assume that public schools admit all students that
apply.
The correlation between student type and achievement translates into marginal costs
decreasing in the student type, reflecting the fact that increasing student socioeconomic
types admitted to a school is an effective way of improving test scores.
This results in both cases, profit maximizers and reputation maximizers, to have a pref-
erence for higher type students. Therefore, in admissions there are incentives to select high
type over low type students, if the types are observed to the school.





where Pkj comes from the demand choice probabilities of student k attending school j,
θk is student’s k type, and mc is the marginal cost that is a function of student’s type.
Conditional on the school capacity, admission thresholds adjust endogenously to clear
the market, working like prices in a regular supply and demand model.
3 Background in Chile
Chile implemented a nationwide school voucher program in 1981 to introduce school choice
and decentralize educational services in 1981. Under this program, students freely chose
between public and private schools. Private schools that did not charge tuition began to
receive from the government, the same per-student voucher as did the public schools. If a
student decided to move to another school, the new school would receive the entire subsidy.
Tuition-charging private schools continued to operate mostly without public funding, staying
mainly unaffected by the reform. This reform also included decentralized public school ad-
ministration, transferring responsibility for public school management from the Ministry of
Education to local municipalities. Public schools continued to be funded centrally, but mu-
nicipalities began to receive the per-student voucher for every child attending their schools,
just as for private subsidized schools. As a result, enrollment losses would now directly affect
their education budgets.
This voucher system separated the financing from the provision of education, and created
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incentives for the private sector to expand their role as provider. The share of private schools
in Chile’s education system grew dramatically: more than 1,000 private schools entered the
market, increasing enrollment in private subsidized schools from 15 to 40% in 20 years. This
shift was more notable in larger, more urban, and wealthier communities (Patrinos and
Sakellariou, 2009; Elacqua et al., 2011). Figure 1 shows the evolution in the share of public
and private schools from 1979 to 2012. The share of students in private schools rose to over
50% of all students in 2012. Public schools had a little over 40% of students and about 7%
went to private non-subsidized schools.
In 1994, with the establishment of the ‘Financiamiento Compartido’ program, private
subsidized schools were allowed to charge a top-up in addition to the voucher. Still, more
than half of these schools did not charge anything. Figure 2 shows the distribution of average
tuition in private subsidized schools in 2007.
An extensive literature has studied the Chilean voucher program. A comparison of stan-
dardized test scores obtained by private and public schools shows that private subsidized
schools have obtained consistently and significantly better results than public schools, but
these results stem from the lack of random assignment of students to schools. Bellei (2005)
outlines some reasons why it is difficult to make comparisons between public and private
schools in Chile: private schools tend to be located in urban areas and serve middle to
middle-high-income students. Contreras et al. (2010) show that the public-private test score
gap drops to zero after controlling for family and school characteristics, and student selec-
tion criteria. Thus there is no evidence that, on average private subsidized schools perform
better than public schools. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find no evidence that choice im-
proved average educational outcomes as measured by test scores, repetition rates, and years
of schooling. They also show that the voucher program led to increased sorting, where the
main effect of unrestricted school choice was an exodus of middle-class students from the
public to the private sector. Contreras et al. (2010) offer evidence that private subsidized
schools were more selective than public schools. Facing excess demand, the better private
subsidized schools practiced screening, seeking to select the best students. As a result, pri-
vate subsidized schools ended up serving a better-informed and wealthier population, at the
expense of municipal schools that served the less-well-off.
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3.1 The 2008 Reform: SEP Law
In response to critics of the old voucher system, in February 2008, Chile adopted a new
policy creating a targeted schooling subsidy at the most vulnerable students (SEP law,
for ‘Subvencion Escolar Preferencial’). The main objective of the reform was to decrease
education inequality.
The SEP reform modified the existing flat subsidy per student by introducing a two-tier
voucher, with a higher subsidy for the most vulnerable students. The main purpose of the
program was to improve equity within the education system, promote equal opportunity, and
improve the quality of education (Weinstein et al., 2010). Starting in 2008, schools received
an extra voucher for students defined as priority by the SEP law.
In addition, participating schools were required to design and implement a plan for edu-
cational improvement. These schools were also required to accept the value of the voucher
as full payment of tuition for preferential students, eliminating extra tuition and other fees
for eligible students.
The monthly values of the extra subsidy are defined by the government and are adjusted
for inflation every year, same as the original subsidy. These values are described in Table 1.8
Student eligibility for the SEP voucher was determined annually according to several
criteria. By 2012, 44% of elementary students were classified as eligible for the SEP benefits.
SEP eligible students are drawn from families in:
a) The program ‘Chile Solidario’ (a social program for the most vulnerable families in
the country).
b) The first section of the public health system (a classification of beneficiaries of the
health system according to household income).
c) The most vulnerable 33% according to the ‘Ficha de Proteccion Social’ (FPS).
d) If a student did not qualify under the first three, other criteria were taken into account
including family income and education of the parents, evaluated by the Ministry of Education
using the FPS.
Schools have the choice to register in the SEP program and only participating schools
receive the SEP benefits. If a school chooses not to participate, it cannot receive the benefits
8In addition, more resources were given to schools having a high concentration of priority students.This is also
described in the second part of Table 1, which shows the resources assigned according to the concentration of SEP
students in the school, on top of the baseline SEP subsidy.
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even if it admits priority students. SEP schools are require to adhere to several conditions.
These include submitting an annual report on the use of SEP resources, presenting a plan
for educational improvement, and establishing academic goals. Moreover, SEP schools must
exempt eligible students from any out-of-pocket expenses, and cannot discriminate based
on academic performance in the admissions process. Finally, the funds must be destined to
measures approved in the school’s educational improvement plan. In terms of enrollment,
virtually all public schools and more than 60% of private subsidized are registered in the
SEP program.
4 Data
My empirical analysis rely on data on student enrollment together with school and student
characteristics. I use four datasets. The first is a comprehensive dataset on yearly school and
student-level data from 2005 to 2012. It contains the universe of students and the schools
where they are enrolled, along with school characteristics. It reports the type of school,
the concentration of SEP students in each school, which schools are registered in the SEP
program, and the total money received from the program each year.
I use two additional datasets to construct school characteristics, like average test scores,
pupil-teacher ratios. First, a dataset containing SIMCE test results of all 4th grade students
from 2005 to 2012. The SIMCE is a standardized test taken by all 4th graders in the country.
Additionally I use data on teacher contracts for all public and private subsidized schools to
construct pupil-teacher ratios. This data includes details about the number of teachers in
each school and the hours in each contract.
Additionally, I use student demographic characteristics like family income, parental edu-
cation, whether they have a computer and internet at home. This information is included in
a questionnaire sent to the families of students taking the SIMCE test. The question about
family income does not ask exact income, but rather people report intervals between $100
and $200 dollars. To calculate average family income per school, I assign to each student
the mean income in the corresponding bin.
My analysis focuses on about 230,000 students per year in public and private subsidized
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schools.9 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for student characteristics in private subsidized
and public schools before the program started in 2007. Student differences in the two types
of school are apparent, with students in private schools coming from wealthier families with
more educated parents. The table also reports descriptives statistics in 2012, showing that
average family income and parental education decreased in both types of school. This is a
result of student redistribution, as I will explain below.
Table 3 describes the number of schools by year and type of school, and from 2008, the
number of schools registered in the SEP program. Almost all public schools, and more than
2/3 of the private subsidized schools, participated in the SEP program after 2008.
4.1 Market Definition
In this setting, there is no clear market definition because students are free to choose a school
without any geographic or administrative constraints. Distance is obviously a relevant vari-
able, but how much students are willing to travel might depend on income, public transport
quality, weather, etc.
I use data on student travel distance to define markets. For each school I join all munici-
palities where 5% or more of the students in that school live. I also define a maximum of 200
kms of travel distance. This creates a network of municipalities that constitute a market.
There are a total of 37 non-overlapping markets under this definition.
Table A1 in the Appendix Tables shows the list of municipalities in each market.
5 Stylized Facts
5.1 Changes in Enrollment
The SEP reform sought to decrease educational inequality by giving more resources to schools
that served a more vulnerable population. However, policy makers did not consider that
this would cause a resorting of students and the consequences that this may have on overall
segregation.
9I exclude private fee-paying schools from the analysis below. These schools charge high tuition and do not receive
any public funding, so they were mainly unaffected by the reform. They serve less than 8% of students, a share that
did not change during the study period.
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In this analysis I distinguish between three types of school in each market: public, private
subsidized that choose to participate in the program (private SEP schools), and private
subsidized that choose to opt out of the program (private non-SEP schools). There are
important student redistribution patterns following the 2008 reform between these three
types.
Average first grade enrollment in different types of school are presented in Figure 3. It
provides the coefficients of a regression of average first grade enrollment on school and year
fixed effects, so it represents average changes within school.10
AverageEnrollmentjt = γj + ηt + εjt
The share of students at public schools steadily declined before and after the reform.
In contrast, private subsidized schools increased their share of students around the time
of the reform both in SEP and non-SEP schools. The new program created incentives for
private subsidized SEP schools to admit more vulnerable students. This explains increased
enrollment for private SEP schools that are willing to admit low-SES students from public
schools. On the other hand, increased enrollment in private subsidized non-SEP must be
explained by changes in school characteristics or peer composition given that these schools
are not directly affected by the reform and incentives for them are unchanged.
Changes in enrollment are not homogeneous across types of students, and they occur
at different times. The probability of going to each type of school for different student
types across the sample time is shown in Figure 4. The probability of going to a public
school dropped significantly for students in the bottom half of the distribution of mother’s
education, with a correspondent rise of similar magnitude in the probability of going to a
private subsidized SEP school.
There is an increase of about 10 percentage points in the probability of going to a private
SEP school for students with mothers with fewer than twelve years of education. This
increase occurrs in a discrete way, starting in 2008, the first year of the SEP reform. This
suggests that private SEP schools started admitting students they had not admitted before,
given the rise in the value of the voucher for vulnerable students. Further, it suggests that
10Changes in enrollment in this section are detrended for demographic country-level changes. Unrelated to this
reform, there are long-term demographic trends of reduced number of children in the country. This has mostly
impacted public school enrollment.
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the high enrollment, before the SEP reform, in public school of students in the bottom half
of the distribution, was likely determined by their inability to meet private schools admission
requirements.
Additionally, students in the middle-high part of the distribution are increasingly likely
to go to private non-SEP schools following the reform, in contrast with the sharp rise in
the probability of enrollment in private SEP for low-SES students. This gradual rise in
probability of going to private subsidized non-SEP schools for more educated parents is likely
to be explained by changes in characteristics in the private SEP schools following the reform.
If highly educated parents have preferences for peer quality, the changes in admissions by
private SEP schools, admitting more vulnerable students, may have led high-SES parents to
stop choosing private SEP schools and enroll instead in private subsidized non-SEP schools.
Table 2 shows the differences in average family characteristics between public and pri-
vate schools in 2007 and 2012, before and after the reform. It is clear that, in 2007 private
subsidized schools served a wealthier and more educated population and obtained higher av-
erage test scores, compared to public schools. By 2012, the differences in parental education
and family income were larger than 2007, but the gap in test scores dropped significantly,
suggesting that the extra resources from the program had a positive effect on achievement.
5.2 Segregation Measures
In this section, I define some measures I use to quantify segregation. Following Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006), we compare the average mother’s education in public schools with the
average in the market where the school operates. To this end, I calculate for each market-
year, the ratio of average mother’s education in public schools compared to the market
average. Values closer to one reflect more integrated markets and lower values reflect more
segregated markets. Notice that the measure is not bounded by one. If public schools had
the most educated parents in the market the measure would be larger than one, reflecting
segregation in the opposite direction.
Figure 5 shows the average ratio from 2005 to 2012. The average type of student in public
schools decreased in comparison with the market average, reflecting less integrated markets.
It looks like the reform did not reverse the prior trend of increasing segregation.
Also, I compute disimilarity indices from 2005 and 2012 for disadvantaged students,
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students with mothers of less than high-school education.
Additionally, dispersion of student types within schools also reflects market stratification.
If markets become more stratified, we would expect a decrease in the dispersion of student
types within a school. I compute the interquartile range (IQR) of student types in each
school, each year, calculated as the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile. I then
run the following regression to capture changes within schools for the three types of school.
IQRjt = γj + ηt + εjt
Table 4 shows the coefficients for the year fixed effects that represent the average change
in IQR within schools compared to 2005. Consistent with the changes in enrollment shown
above, public and private SEP schools had lower student dispersion within school, while no
significant change was seen in dispersion in private non-SEP schools.
Segregation may differ with market competitiveness. More competitive markets have a
larger presence of private subsidized schools and are less concentrated in terms of market
share. I separate markets into three groups depending on how concentrated they are, using
the Herfindahl Index (HHI). This measure is calculated as the sum of the square of the
market shares for each market and each year. Therefore, it reflects the level of concentration
in the market, where a higher index is associated with more concentrated markets.
Average change within market of the ratio of the average mother’s education in public
schools to the market average for the three groups of markets is shown in Figure 6. Results
show that segregation levels in 2005 were already lower in more competitive markets. This
reflects the greater segregation in more competitive and larger markets. Furthermore, the
drop during this period was larger in more competitive markets, consistent with the changes
in enrollment shown above.
Several mechanisms could explain these changes in enrollment. On the supply side,
schools may be changing their admission decisions in response to the program. Additionally,
changes in school characteristics or peer composition could have changed parent sorting.
To explain what drives parents’ enrollment decisions, we must model their preferences for
school characteristics and peer quality. From the discrete changes in enrollment for low-
SES parents, shown in Figure 4, it looks like low-SES parents’ decisions were constrained
14
by private school selection thresholds. If this was the case, we need to account for this
restriction in order to correctly estimate preferences.
The SEP reform created incentives to decrease the cream-skimming behavior of private
schools selecting students with higher socioeconomic characteristics. This resulted in a large
migration of students from public schools, leaving only the most vulnerable students in public
schools. On the other hand, it allowed private schools with higher proportion of high-type
students to opt out of the program, attracting more high-type students. In sum, the program
seems to have mainly caused a redistribution of the most vulnerable students between some
private schools and public schools. Moreover, it kept higher-income students in the non-SEP
private subsidized schools and the most vulnerable students in public schools.
5.3 School Participation in the SEP Program
An important feature of the SEP program is that it gives schools the option to participate
in the program. A school’s decision to participate in the SEP program depends on several
factors: the percentage of eligible students it has, the effect its choice may have on its current
and future student body, and the costs associated with the program. To receive the voucher
from eligible students, schools must be registered in the SEP program. Therefore, the fact
that some private subsidized schools that have priority students still choose to opt out and
forgo the new voucher, reflect some costs associated with joining the program.
I analyze the school and market characteristics that determine a school’s decisions to
enter the program with a probit model described in Equation 3. Here 1(SEP -School jm) is
an indicator equal to one if school j in market m participates in the SEP program. Xjm
is a vector of school characteristics including average family income in 2007, test results in
2006 and 2007, proportion of low income students in 2007, school size in 2007, proportion
of students with a computer at home and the proportion of students with internet at home,
and the average size of the class. Also, Zm is a vector of market controls, including three
measures of competition in market m. The level of competition in the market might affect
participation decisions if schools take other schools’ decisions into consideration when making
their own participation decision. The three measures are the proportion of private schools,




) = α + βXjm + γZm + εjm (3)
Lower average income, higher proportion of low income students, bigger class size, and
more concentrated markets, all imply a higher probability of participation. Table 5 shows
probit estimation results, and the marginal effects at the means of the other variables.
Interestingly, the probability of entering the SEP program decreases with the competitiveness
of the market where the school operates. This might be explained by the risk of losing their
high-SES students to competitors. If high-SES students have a preference for better peers,
they may prefer schools that opt out of the program. Students in more competitive markets
have more choice about where to go. Therefore, for any given school, the risk increases
with the competitiveness of the market. This is consistent with the results from preference
estimation that are explained in Section 7.
6 School Admissions
In the context of Chile’s voucher system, private subsidized schools comprise a heteroge-
neous group of entities, including for-profit and non-profit organizations, religious and non-
religious, single schools, and large corporations with multiple schools. Nonetheless, no matter
the form of their objective function, because of the correlation between achievement and stu-
dent types, they all have incentives to select students from more educated parents. Higher
parental education is associated with better student behavior, more involved parents, the
ability to attract better teachers, higher test scores, etc. This is also supported by the ob-
served stratification shown in the stylized facts and the extensive political discussions over
the implementation of mechanisms to deter selection.
The literature that estimates parents’ preferences for school quality assumes that the
only type of selection that schools have is through prices. Yet. most of these schools do not
charge any tuition 11.
Aditionally, schools are not allowed to test students on admission and they do not have
any information about performance. Therefore, if schools are selecting students, discrimina-
11Aproximately half of the private subsidized do not charge any tuition and 75% charge less than $30 per month,
see 2
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tion has to be based on other indicators. One of the easiest being parental education, likely
observed through parental interviews.
The SEP reform provides incentives for schools that participate in the program to admit
more vulnerable students. The question is whether schools have the means to react given
that they don’t have any measure of student performance at the moment of admission.
As was introduced in Section 2, the admission process can be modeled as a threshold on
the student type that a school is willing to admit. One issue is that these thresholds are
unobserved. Using mother’s education as a proxy for the student type 12, I show that it
does behave as a threshold, and that private schools do, in fact, select students based on
socioeconomic characteristics. To show this, I exploit the variation in incentives to schools
that participate in the SEP program to lower their admissions threshold, as well as variation
in the value of the voucher. Table 1 shows variation in the value of the voucher in the studied
period.
First, I take the lowest 1% of mother’s education in each school each year, as the ‘observed’
admissions threshold (θ∗jt), and look at changes in θ
∗
jt when capacity increases (when a school
adds another classroom) or when the value of the per-student subsidy increases.
I estimate equations 4 and 5 by OLS using school fixed effects, where vt is the value of
the per-student subsidy in year t, and Cjt is the number of classrooms at school j in year t.
θ∗jt = α + βvt + γj + εjt (4)
θ∗jt = α + βCjt + γj + εjt (5)
Panel A in Table 6 shows a significant drop in the cutoff values when a school adds a
clasroom or when the voucher value increases. This means that when a school increases its
capacity or when the voucher program gets more generous, schools are likely to increase its
range for admission.
Second, I look at how the threshold changes when schools start participating in the SEP
program. I estimate equation 6 by OLS using school fixed effects, and 1(SEP -School)jt as
an indicator for whether school j is participating in the SEP program in year t.
12Results are very similar if instead I take family income or socioeconomic status constructed using factorial analysis
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θ∗jt = α + β1(SEP -School)jt + γj + εjt (6)
Panel B in Table 6 shows the average within-school change in the observed threshold for
private subsidized SEP schools, when the school starts participating in the SEP program.
The first and second columns show the results for public schools and private subsidized
schools, respectively. We see a large drop in a school’s admissions threshold after the school
enrolls in the reform for private subsidized schools. Yet, part of this drop may be explained
by a price effect, because the program prevents schools from charging any tuition to eligible
students. Therefore schools that were charging tuition before 2008 now become free for
eligible students. To get at this issue, the third column estimates the drop in the threshold
using just the sample of schools that did not charge any tuition before 2008. For these schools
there is no price effect. The drop in the threshold is smaller, but still large and significant.
All regressions include school fixed-effects, so they capture the variation within schools.
These results suggest that schools are effectively able to select students based on socioeco-
nomic characteristics and that mother’s education can usefully proxy for schools’ selection
process in admissions.
7 Demand Estimation
Section 5 established two main patterns of sorting following the SEP reform. (1) More low-
SES students enrolled in private subsidized SEP schools instead of publics schools, and (2)
more middle-SES students enrolled in private subsidized non-SEP schools instead of private
SEP schools. Different demand and supply mechanisms could drive these sorting patterns:
changes in schools selection policies resulting from the SEP incentives, changes in tuition
from SEP requirements, changes in school characteristics, and peer composition that could
drive parents to change their choice of school.
Then, in section 6 I show evidence of private schools’ cream-skimming behavior in terms
of socioeconomic characteristics, and how this behavior changed following the reform for the
participating schools. In particular, I show that mother’s education is a good proxy for the
characteristics that are relevant for admissions, and that there is a discrete drop in admission
thresholds after a school registers in the SEP program. This explains the higher enrollment
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of low-SES students in private subsidized SEP schools.
Next, I model parents’ decisions as a discrete choice of a single school from their mar-
ket. The reform changed important school characteristics and peer composition providing
variation in average student type, class size, pupil-teacher ratio, and test scores. I use this
variation to identify preference parameters in the parents’ utility function.
Additionally, because of the evidence shown in Section 6 about private school cream-
skimming behavior, it is important to account for these admission restrictions to low-SES
parents to properly recover preference parameters. That is, the choice set may be different
for low-SES parents than for high-SES parents. Even if some schools are free, they might
not admit some students based on their socioeconomics characteristics. The assumption in
the literature that every school is available for every student is not innocuous and it biases
the estimation of preferences.
Therefore, it is important to define the choice set of feasible schools for each student. If
thresholds were observed, the choice set for each student would be easily defined. In this
context, admission criteria in each school is unknown, and this could be different across
schools. It has been long discussed in the literature and in politics, that private subsidized
school select students using parental interviews.
I assume that the admissions threshold for a school θ∗jt is known. For the estimation, I use
the observed lowest 1% in mother’s education admitted for each private subsidized school
as a proxy for θ∗jt. Admission thresholds are obviously an endogenous equilibrium outcome,
but this should not affect the estimation of parental preferences. Fack et al. (2015) show
that estimates do not change when endogenizing the cutoffs, suggesting that in large enough
markets, cutoffs can be treated as exogenous to estimate the demand parameters. Therefore,
if equilibrium thresholds are known, estimates of utility parameters can be obtained by
restricting the choice set for each student to the feasible schools only. Once recovered the
utility parameters, admission thresholds are allowed to adjust for counterfactual exercises.
In summary, students type θi, is defined as their mothers’ education, and parents choose
the school that maximizes their utility within the schools in their choice set (θ∗jt ≤ θi).
The utility student i gets from attending school j is given by:
Uijt = αpijt +Xjtβ
i − γdijt + ξjt + εijt
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where
βi = β¯ + β
oWi
Here, Xjt are school characteristics, dijt is the distance for student i to school j, ξjt
is a year-school specific term that represents unobserved school quality. εijt represents an
unobserved idiosyncratic preference of student i for school j, distributed independently across
schools and students.
Xj includes several school attributes: the type of school, whether it participates in the
SEP program, the previous years test scores and class size (to measure observed quality for
parents), the previous years peer composition (average and variance of the type of students
in the school), to account for preferences for certain peers beyond their effect on test scores. I
use previous year characteristics on grounds that this is the information available to parents
when making school decisions, and I am abstracting from any social interactions that may
affect the decision.
If we assume that εij is distributed type I extreme value, this produces a logit functional
form for the probability that student i of choosing school j.






vij = αpij +Xjβ
i − γdij + ξj
and J(θi) is the choice set of schools available for a student of type θi.
Since only differences in utility matter, it is necessary to normalize the utility for one
alternative to zero. Effectively, there is no outside option because all students are required
to enroll in a school and I observe the entire market. Most schools in each market are quite
small, so instead of just normalizing the utility with respect to one school, I take a third of
the public schools in each market as the outside option to normalize the utility. I assume that
this group of schools share the same unobserved quality term, and public schools are assumed
to be available to everyone. In the estimation, I control for observable characteristics of these
schools in each market.
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7.1 Estimation and Identification
As explained above, the probability of student i of going to school j is given by:





where vij = αpij + Xjβ
i − γdij + ξj, and J(θi) is the choice set of schools available to a
student of type θi.
In Xj I include previous year test scores, class size, and peer composition (average and
variance of the type of students in the school).
Parental heterogeneity is reflected in family income levels and mother’s education. For
mother’s education, I include indicators for being in one of four groups: less than eight years,
less than high-school, high-school or more, and university degree. The omitted category is
less than eight years.
These probabilities Pij are conditional on the vector of θ
∗. Let δjt = β¯Xjt + ξjt the
year-school specific term that does not vary across students, and η = [α, γ, β0, δ] the set of
parameters to estimate. To recover the parameters from the utility function, I consider the









where xij = 1 if student i chooses school j and 0 otherwise.
For the estimation I proceed in two steps. First I obtain α, γ, and β0 that maximize
L, and following Berry (1994), I estimate δjt matching the observed market shares for each
school to the estimated shares as a function of the parameters in each iteration. This way,
δjt (year-school specific term) allows the model to perfectly match school-level shares.
In the second step, from the panel of δˆjt and Xjt, I estimate the average utility parameters
β¯ from an OLS regression using school fixed effects to control for unobservable school level
characteristics that may be correlated with Xjt.
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Identification of α, γ, β0, and δj is provided by the variation within markets of different
types of students and the variation in enrollments before and after the reform given by the
changes in the choice set for each type of student and the changes in school characteristics
and peer composition. The variation that identifies β¯ comes from the within-school variation
generated by the SEP reform. The identification assumption is that changes in Xjt are
uncorrelated with changes in the unobserved quality ξjt. I also assume that parents take θ
∗
as given, similar to a price taking assumption, I assume that each parent is too small to have
an effect on the admissions threshold. Also, because I use previous years’ characteristics and
I assume that this is what parents consider when choosing a school, and I abstract from any
social interactions that may affect the decision.
7.2 Parameter Estimates
My results indicate that it is important to consider the cream-skimming restrictions when
estimating parental preference parameters. Estimates for the average utility parameters are
shown in Table 7. I estimate the model both with and without cream-skimming restrictions
in admissions. The first column shows results of the full model including the admission
restrictions, where each student has a limited number of schools available depending on his
type. The second column shows results without considering restrictions on the choice set
given by the admissions thresholds from the private subsidized schools. Column 1 of Table 7
shows that parents with low education (the omitted category in the parent education group)
care about the average type of peers, the homogeneity of peers in the school (negative
coefficient on IQR of peer type), and class size. Column 2 of Table 7 indicates that low-SES
parents do not care about class size, and if anything they dislike higher test scores and higher
average peer quality. The differences between columns 1 and 2 suggest that ignoring access
restrictions leads to underestimating low-SES parents’ preferences for quality. The model
rationalizes the enrollment decisions in the data. In other words, if we ignore the restricted
choice set and observe low-SES parents not selecting high-quality schools even when they
are free to choose them, one might infer that they have low preferences for school quality
and peers. Column 1 shows that this is in fact not true, and this explains the changes in
enrollment of low-SES students following the reform.
Markets differ according to size, competitiveness, and income level, and this may be
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correlated with average utility parameters. For this reason, I estimate parameters separately
for each market and regress each parameter on the log of the Herfindahl Index (HHI), market
size, and average mother’s education in the market. Table 8 shows these results. A larger
parameter on peers is correlated with more concentrated and smaller markets, and a higher
average parental education is correlated with less concentrated and larger markets, opposite
to the parameter on test scores. It appears that parents in more competitive and more
educated markets care more about peers and less about standardized test scores.
My results suggest that parents’ most important consideration is the average type of
students in the school, and the magnitude of this parameter increases with the level of
parental education. Table9 shows estimates for the heterogeneity parameters α, γ, and β0
using the model with the restriction on the choice set for each student. Panel A shows
weighted average coefficients by market size for income and education levels. Panel B shows
coefficients for the average person in each group (considering they have average income for
the group). For the best educated parents, a one standard deviation in the average type
of student gives 10 times as much utility as a one standard deviation in test scores (1.751
compared to 0.148).
8 Counterfactuals: Segregation mechanisms
I use these estimates to quantify how much of the observed segregation in the data is ex-
plained by parental preferences and how much by school cream-skimming behavior. In both
exercises I assume that schools cannot increase capacity beyond their maximum observed
enrollment over the data period.
Simulating market outcomes in counterfactual experiments requires computing equilib-
rium admission thresholds. For this, an allocation mechanism has to be defined to obtain the
new thresholds. In a first exercise, I assume a centralized admissions process to efectively
eliminate all cream-skimming behavior from schools. To do this, I assume a random serial
dictatorship mechanism for assignment. In a second exercise, I change preference parameters
to eliminate preference for peer quality. In this case, to do the matching, school preferences
over students would need to be known. I assume private subsidized schools maintain their
admission policy of prefering higher types to lower types and allow admission thresholds
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to adjust given the new preferences. Each school may rank students according to different
criteria, but I assume they all rank them based on mother’s education. This would generate
new equilibrium thresholds.
Table 10 shows the average mother’s education in private and public schools and the share
of students going to public school in each exercise compared to the actual values in 2007 and
2012. Shutting down parental preferences for peers, increases enrollment in public schools by
8 percentage points on average compared to 2012, and the gap on average mother’s education
between public and private, decreasing significantly by more than 75%. On the other hand,
eliminating school selection, decreases enrollment in public schools by 2 percentage points,
and only reduces the gap in mother’s education by 30% compared to 2012.
Figure 7 shows the probability of going to public and private subsidized, by type of
student when there is a lottery for admissions. The probabilities for low and medium type
students is equal for public and private, at around 50%. This is expected given the lottery.
High-type students are still disproportionally more likely to go to private than to public,
mostly because of prices.
Figure 8 shows the opposite pattern in the probabilities of going to public and private
school, when there are no preferences for peer quality. In this case, high type students are as
likely to go to public than to private, and low-type students being significantly more likely
to go to public school.
9 Summary and Conclusions
This paper studies the mechanisms behind school segregation, using the variation generated
by a reform to the Chilean school voucher system. The reform intervened in the educational
system in an innovative way that makes it useful to study cream-skimming behavior from
private schools. The within school variation in peer composition, class size, and admission
thresholds allows me to estimate parental preferences for school and peer characteristics.
My main results can be summarized in three points. First, I show that private subsidized
schools effectively cream-skimmed students based on socioeconomic characteristics. Second,
estimates for parents preferences differ when accounting for supply-side selection in admis-
sions. Ignoring these restrictions leads to underestimates of preferences for school and peer
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quality. My estimates of structural parameters for parent preferences show that low-SES
students care about school quality and better peers. This explains the migration of students
from public to private subsidized schools. Third, parents all care about better peers, with
magnitudes increasing in parental education and wealth. This explains the shift of middle
income students from private schools that participated in the program to schools that opted
out. It also explains the decision of schools in more competitive markets to opt out of the
reform, seeking to avoid the risk of losing high-SES students.
Previous research has suggested that that cream-skimming concerns can be alleviated
through better program design, for example a tiered voucher system. While this paper
shows that a tiered voucher, in fact, decreases cream-skimming by schools, it shows that this
may have little effect on overall stratification if parents have strong preferences for better
peers.
Understanding the role of parental preferences and the mechanisms that underlie school
segregation is crucial to evaluating the potential impact of school choice programs on social
stratification in schools. School socioeconomic segregation is particularly important given
evidence that it can perpetuate long-term income inequality.
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Table 1: Increase in the Value of the Voucher for SEP Students
Preschool to 6th grade
2005-2007 2008-2011 2012
Baseline Subsidy $68 $79 $81
SEP Subsidy $0 $46 $56





Note: This table presents the values for the preferential subsidy for 2008 and 2011,
and the extra voucher the schools get for a high concentration of priority students in
US dollars. Source: Mineduc (2012)
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Table 2: Student Characteristics for Public and Private Subsidized Schools in 2007 and 2012
Student Characteristics in 2007
Public Priv. Subsid. T-Test
Mother’s Education (yrs) 10.29 12.47 -34.24
Family Income (US$) 351.54 629.87 -27.06
Math Score 229.38 251.55 -23.65
Language Score 240.10 260.15 -24.19
Class Size 25.49 25.96 -1.42
Student Characteristics in 2012
Public Priv. Subsid. T-Test
Mother’s Education (yrs) 10.06 12.15 -37.91
Family Income (US$) 294.08 571.40 -28.91
Math Score 246.71 261.27 -18.20
Language Score 253.59 268.41 -20.97
Class Size 23.19 26.29 -11.18
Note: This table presents average statistics in each type of school in 2007 and 2012.
The average is calculated over all students in 4th grade in the school and over the 4
years of the program.
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Table 3: Number of Schools by Type and Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total 7,425 7,457 7,896 7,764 7,857 7,890 7,704 7612
Private Non Subsidized 409 399 406 406 401 406 405 393
Private Subsidized 2,694 2,698 2,923 2,936 3,060 3,085 3,094 3,124
Municipal 4,322 4,360 4,567 4,422 4,396 4,399 4,205 4,095
All SEP - - - 6,553 6,629 6,649 6,456 6,328
SEP Private Subsidized - - - 2,137 2,235 2,252 2,253 2,237
SEP Municipal - - - 4,416 4,394 4,397 4,203 4,091
Note: This table presents the number of schools each year by type of school starting in 2005, and the
number of schools enrolled in the SEP program from 2008.
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Table 4: Changes in the Interquartile Range by Type of School Over Time
Public Private SEP Private NonSEP
2006 -0.079* -0.068 0.066
(0.038) (0.048) (0.060)
2007 -0.098* -0.185*** 0.064
(0.039) (0.050) (0.063)
2008 -0.033 -0.165*** -0.079
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2009 -0.145*** -0.173*** -0.018
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2010 -0.158*** -0.298*** -0.085
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2011 -0.196*** -0.293*** -0.040
(0.039) (0.047) (0.061)
2012 -0.147*** -0.277*** 0.004
(0.039) (0.047) (0.061)
Constant 3.950*** 3.464*** 3.273***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.043)
R-squared 0.286 0.295 0.346
N 13331 12181 5293
Note: This table presents average changes in interquartile range
by type of school, in terms of mother’s education. *,**, and ***
denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard errors
are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Probit Regression of the Probability of Being a SEP School
Panel A
Probit Regression Coefficients
Average Income -0.208** -0.184** -0.166* -0.203**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090)
Prop. of Low Income Students 1.488*** 1.560*** 1.470*** 1.416***
(0.342) (0.343) (0.348) (0.348)
Avg. Score in 2006 -0.186*** -0.187*** -0.207*** -0.201***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070)
Avg. Score in 2007 -0.072 -0.071 -0.081 -0.078
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Average Class Size 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.186*** 0.184***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Herfindahl Index 2.493*** 2.285***
(0.660) (0.721)
Proportion Private -0.715* -0.040
(0.383) (0.434)
Proportion Low Inc Market 1.302** 0.743
(0.601) (0.648)
Constant -0.419** 0.060 -1.160*** -0.838
(0.201) (0.310) (0.413) (0.565)
Panel B
Marginal Effects
Average Income -0.070** -0.062** -0.056* -0.068**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Prop. of Low Income Students 0.499*** 0.526*** 0.495*** 0.474***
(0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.116)
Avg. Score in 2006 -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.067***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Avg. Score in 2007 -0.024 -0.024 -0.027 -0.026
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Average Class Size 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Herfindahl Index 0.836*** 0.765***
(0.220) (0.240)
Proportion Private -0.241* -0.013
(0.129) (0.145)
Proportion Low Inc Market 0.439** 0.249
(0.202) (0.217)
N 1279 1279 1279 1279
Note: Panel A presents Probit estimation coefficients for private schools of the probability of being
a SEP school on different school and market characteristics. Panel B presents marginal effects at the
average of the other variables. The estimation is based on school characteristics in 2007. *,**, and
*** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Changes in Admissions Threshold
Panel A: Cutoffs changes with changes in voucher values and school capacity
Dep Variable - Lowest 1% of Student Mother’s Education
Public Schools Private Subs. Schools All Schools
Voucher Value 0.158 -1.353***
(0.099) (0.104)
Number of Classes -0.368***
(0.038)
Constant 2.281*** 9.047*** 6.069***
(0.225) (0.239) (0.064)
School FE X X X
R-squared 0.273 0.541 0.742
N 13317 17474 33833
Panel B: Cutoffs changes when a school joins SEP program
Dep Variable - Lowest 1% of Student Mother’s Education
Public Schools Private Subsidized SEP Schools
All Tuition=0
SEP School 0.055 -0.458*** -0.344***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.065)
Constant 3.201*** 5.336*** 4.210***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.047)
School FE X X X
R-squared 0.371 0.527 0.401
N 13246 12181 4824
Note: This table presents changes in the observed lowest 1% in the mother’s education
when school changes capacity (adds another classroom) or increases the value of the
voucher or joins the SEP program. The estimation is based on regression with school
fixed effects to capture variation within schools, showing that this is a good proxy
for the admissions threshold. *,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1%
level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Estimation Results - Average Utility Parameters
Dep Variable: Average Utility (δjt)
Restricted Unrestricted
Class Size -0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Peer Type 0.128** -0.183**
(0.045) (0.069)
IQR Peer Type -0.055* -0.038
(0.024) (0.051)
Avg Math Score -0.004 -0.084*
(0.028) (0.043)




School FE X X
R-squared 0.848 0.672
N 9665 9665
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of average utility of a
school on different lagged school characteristics: average class size, av-
erage standardized mother’s education, interquartile range of mother’s
education, average standardized math test score, and an indicator for
participating in the reform. It shows estimates for both, the model in-
cluding the restriction on the choice set and for the unrestricted version.
*,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard
errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of Average Utility Parameters across Markets
Average Peer Type Avg Math Score Class Size IQR Peer Type
Log(HHI) 0.054*** -0.048*** 0.011*** 0.058***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006)
Std Market Size -0.043*** -0.014 0.008*** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006)
Std Market Size Sq 0.114*** 0.024*** -0.001* 0.017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
Avg Mother’s Education 0.365*** -0.274*** -0.003* -0.301***
(0.027) (0.017) (0.001) (0.013)
Constant 0.256*** -0.264*** 0.031*** 0.080***
(0.048) (0.031) (0.002) (0.023)
R-squared 0.063 0.034 0.064 0.124
N 9665 9665 9665 9665
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of average utility parameters on different market characteristics:
log of Herfindahl Index, standardized market size, and size squared, and average mother’s education in the market.
*,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Estimation Results - Heterogeneity on Preferences by Income and Mother’s Education
Panel A: Heterogeneity Coefficients
< 8 years High School More than High School University Income
Avg Peer Type 0.211*** 1.041*** 1.751*** 0.743***
(0.047) (0.052) (0.094) (0.058)
Avg Math Score -0.001 0.054 0.148*** 0.101***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.048)
IQR Peer Type -0.016 -0.048 -0.047 0.07
(0.096) (0.102) (0.123) (0.036)
Class Size 0.008 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002)
Distance 0.023 -0.263*** -0.224*** -0.260*** 0.004
(0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
Tuition -0.301*** 0.023 0.003 -0.019*** 0.013
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Panel B: Average Coefficient for Each Mother’s Education Group
High School More than High School University
Average Peer Type 0.066 1.109 2.342
Avg Math Score -0.102 0.001 0.169
IQR Peer Type -0.076 -0.077 -0.027
Class Size 0.001 0.014 0.012
Distance -0.265 -0.225 -0.261
Tuition 0.014 0.031 -0.011
Note: Panel A presents average heterogeneity coefficients across markets weighted by market size. The model
allows for heterogeneity in preferences depending on income and mother’s education. Income is measured
as a continues variable and mother’s education as an indicator for being in one of four groups. School
characteristics included are average class size, average standardized mother’s education, interquartile range
of mother’s education, average standardized math test score. Also the distance between the school and the
student’s municipality and tuition. Panel B presents average preference parameter for each education group
for the average income for that group in each market. All the estimates in this table correspond to the full
model that includes the restriction on the choice sets depending on the student type.
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Table 10: Counterfactual Comparisons
Actual Actual Lottery for No Pref. for
2007 2012 School Selection Peer Quality
Avg M.Ed Private 0.393 0.372 0.303 0.219
Avg M.Ed Public 0.335 -0.203 -0.073 0.096
Share Public Schools 0.521 0.395 0.379 0.475
Note: This table presents simulation results assuming two different scenarios: first, that parents have no preference
for peers and assuming no cream-skimming. It shows averages across markets for the share of students going to
public school and the average mother’s education of students in public schools and private subsidized schools.
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Public Private Subsidized Private Non- Subsidized
Note: This figure shows the evolution on the share of students that is enrolled in each type of school from the
beginning of the voucher system in Chile.
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Tuition (US$)
Private Subsidized Schools in 2007
Note: This figure shows the distribution of average tuition charged by private subsidized schools in US$ in 2007,
before the program started. More than half of the schools did not charge any tuition.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Public Private SEP Private NonSEP
Note: This figure shows changes in average first grade enrollment within schools. It shows coefficients from a regression
of enrollment on year and school fixed effects.
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Note: Each graph shows the probabilities for each level of mother’s education of enrolling in different type of school each year. The probabilities are calculated
based on the coefficients from a multinomial logit model where a student has the option of enrolling in four types of schools: public, private subsidized SEP,
private subsidized non-SEP, and private fee-paying schools. The probabilities for the last type of school are not shown here because no significant changes are
observed in this period.
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2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Note: This figure shows average within market changes in the integration measure. The ratio is constructed as the
average student type in public schools over the average student type in the market where the public schools operate.
Higher values mean more integrated markets where public schools have a more representative student body compared
to the market where they operate. Each point in the graph represents the coefficients of a regression of the ratio on
year and market fixed effects.
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2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
High Medium Low
Note: This figure shows average changes in the ratio of mother’s education within market for three groups of markets
depending on the level of concentration. Concentration in each market was calculated as the Herfindahl Index, which
is equal to the sum of the squares of the shares of each school in the market. A high index means high concentration
which is associated with lower participation of private subsidized schools. The ratio is constructed as the average
student type in public schools over the average student type in the market where the public schools operate. Each
point in the graph represents the coefficients of a regression of the ratio on year and market fixed effects.
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Mother's Education (detrended)
Public Private Subsidized
Lottery for Admissions with Capacity Constraints
Note: This figure shows average probability of attending public or private subsidized schools when no selection from
private schools is allowed. I assume a lottery for admissions, with a random serial dictatorship allocation mechanism.
I assume that school capacities cannot increse beyond the maximum observed enrollment during this time period.
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Mother's Education (detrended)
Public Private Subsidized
No Preference for Peer Quality
Note: This figure shows average probability of attending public or private subsidized schools when preferences for
peer quality is shut down. I assume schools still prefer high type to low types and allow thresholds to adjust. I
assume that school capacities cannot increse beyond the maximum observed enrollment during this time period.
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Table A1: Municipalities by Market
Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market
1 IQUIQUE 1 5 LOS ANDES 17 7 RAUCO 23
1 ALTO HOSPICIO 1 5 SAN ESTEBAN 17 7 ROMERAL 23
1 ARICA 2 5 SAN FELIPE 17 7 SAGRADA FAMILIA 23
2 ANTOFAGASTA 3 5 CALLE LARGA 17 7 TENO 23
2 CALAMA 4 5 PANQUEHUE 17 7 TALCA 24
2 TOCOPILLA 5 5 LLAILLAY 17 7 SAN CLEMENTE 24
3 COPIAPO 6 5 CATEMU 17 7 MAULE 24
3 TIERRA AMARILLA 6 5 PUCHUNCAVI 18 7 PELARCO 24
3 CALDERA 7 5 QUINTERO 18 7 SAN RAFAEL 24
3 DIEGO DE ALMAGRO 8 5 SAN ANTONIO 19 7 SAN JAVIER 25
3 CHANARAL 8 5 SANTO DOMINGO 19 7 VILLA ALEGRE 25
3 HUASCO 9 5 EL QUISCO 19 7 CONSTITUCION 26
3 VALLENAR 9 5 CARTAGENA 19 7 COLBUN 27
4 LA SERENA 10 5 ALGARROBO 19 7 LONGAVI 27
4 COQUIMBO 10 6 CODEGUA 20 7 LINARES 27
4 VICUNA 10 6 RENGO 20 7 YERBAS BUENAS 27
4 ANDACOLLO 10 6 REQUINOA 20 7 PARRAL 28
4 SALAMANCA 11 6 COLTAUCO 20 7 RETIRO 28
4 LOS VILOS 11 6 MOSTAZAL 20 7 CAUQUENES 29
4 ILLAPEL 11 6 MACHALI 20 8 HUALQUI 30
4 CANELA 11 6 RANCAGUA 20 8 TOME 30
4 OVALLE 12 6 GRANEROS 20 8 PENCO 30
4 MONTE PATRIA 12 6 SAN VICENTE 20 8 HUALPEN 30
4 PUNITAQUI 12 6 MALLOA 20 8 TALCAHUANO 30
5 QUILPUE 13 6 DONIHUE 20 8 CONCEPCION 30
5 VILLA ALEMANA 13 6 PICHIDEGUA 20 8 CORONEL 30
5 VINA DEL MAR 13 6 PEUMO 20 8 LOTA 30
5 VALPARAISO 13 6 OLIVAR 20 8 CHIGUAYANTE 30
5 CONCON 13 6 COINCO 20 8 SAN PEDRO DE LA PAZ 30
5 CASABLANCA 14 6 QUINTA DE TILCOCO 20 8 FLORIDA 30
5 QUILLOTA 15 6 LAS CABRAS 21 8 SANTA JUANA 30
5 LA CRUZ 15 6 CHIMBARONGO 22 8 CURANILAHUE 31
5 OLMUE 15 6 SAN FERNANDO 22 8 LOS ALAMOS 31
5 HIJUELAS 15 6 CHEPICA 22 8 LEBU 31
5 LIMACHE 15 6 NANCAGUA 22 8 ARAUCO 32
5 NOGALES 15 6 SANTA CRUZ 22 8 CANETE 33
5 CALERA 15 6 PALMILLA 22 8 LOS ANGELES 34
5 LA LIGUA 16 6 PERALILLO 22 8 NACIMIENTO 34
5 CABILDO 16 7 CURICO 23 8 MULCHEN 34
5 PAPUDO 16 7 MOLINA 23 8 NEGRETE 34
Note: This table shows the municipalities and markets used in the estimation.
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Table A1: Continuation - Municipalities by Market
Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market
8 QUILLECO 34 10 PUERTO MONTT 49 13 COLINA 70
8 SANTA BARBARA 34 10 LLANQUIHUE 49 13 LA PINTANA 70
8 YUMBEL 35 10 LOS MUERMOS 49 13 MAIPU 70
8 CABRERO 35 10 CALBUCO 49 13 RENCA 70
8 PEMUCO 35 10 FRUTILLAR 49 13 SANTIAGO 70
8 YUNGAY 35 10 PUERTO VARAS 49 13 LA FLORIDA 70
8 CHILLAN 36 10 MAULLIN 49 13 PUENTE ALTO 70
8 BULNES 36 10 CASTRO 50 13 PENALOLEN 70
8 SAN CARLOS 36 10 ANCUD 51 13 QUINTA NORMAL 70
8 QUILLON 36 10 DALCAHUE 52 13 SAN BERNARDO 70
8 NIQUEN 36 10 QUELLON 53 13 SAN MIGUEL 70
8 COIHUECO 36 10 OSORNO 54 13 PUDAHUEL 70
8 SAN IGNACIO 36 10 PURRANQUE 55 13 ESTACION CENTRAL 70
8 PINTO 36 10 VALDIVIA 56 13 LO PRADO 70
8 CHILLAN VIEJO 36 10 FUTRONO 57 13 CONCHALI 70
8 SAN NICOLAS 36 10 LAGO RANCO 58 13 NUNOA 70
8 EL CARMEN 36 10 LA UNION 58 13 LA CISTERNA 70
8 LAJA 37 10 RIO BUENO 58 13 QUILICURA 70
9 TEMUCO 38 10 LANCO 59 13 EL BOSQUE 70
9 VILCUN 38 10 PAILLACO 60 13 RECOLETA 70
9 PADRE LAS CASAS 38 10 LOS LAGOS 60 13 CERRO NAVIA 70
9 CUNCO 39 10 MARIQUINA 61 13 LAS CONDES 70
9 GORBEA 40 10 PANGUIPULLI 62 13 SAN JOAQUIN 70
9 FREIRE 40 11 COYHAIQUE 63 13 CERRILLOS 70
9 PITRUFQUEN 40 11 AYSEN 64 13 INDEPENDENCIA 70
9 CURACAUTIN 41 12 PUNTA ARENAS 65 13 LO BARNECHEA 70
9 LAUTARO 41 12 NATALES 66 13 LAMPA 70
9 LONCOCHE 42 13 PENAFLOR 67 13 LO ESPEJO 70
9 CARAHUE 43 13 TALAGANTE 67 13 PROVIDENCIA 70
9 NUEVA IMPERIAL 43 13 PAINE 67 13 PEDRO AGUIRRE CERDA 70
9 TEODORO SCHMIDT 43 13 MELIPILLA 67 13 LA REINA 70
9 CHOLCHOL 43 13 EL MONTE 67 13 HUECHURABA 70
9 TOLTEN 44 13 PIRQUE 67 13 MACUL 70
9 VILLARRICA 45 13 ISLA DE MAIPO 67 13 LA GRANJA 70
9 PUCON 45 13 BUIN 67 13 SAN RAMON 70
9 ANGOL 46 13 PADRE HURTADO 67 13 VITACURA 70
9 ERCILLA 47 13 CALERA DE TANGO 67
9 COLLIPULLI 47 13 MARIA PINTO 67
9 TRAIGUEN 48 13 CURACAVI 68
9 VICTORIA 48 13 TILTIL 69
Note: This table shows the municipalities and markets used in the estimation.
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